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ARTICLE

California Climate Law -- Model or Object
Lesson?
DANIEL A. FARBER*
In the invitation to this Symposium on Reconceptualizing the
Future of Environmental Law, the organizers explained that the
Symposium “focuses on the continued expansion of environmental
law into distinct areas of the law, requiring an increasingly
multidisciplinary approach beyond that of traditional federal
regulation.”1 In short, the question posed is about the future
proliferation of environmental measures outside the previous
domains of federal environmental statutes.
At the risk of being guilty of local parochialism, I would like
to discuss how the future described by the organizers has already
arrived in California—both in the sense that a great deal is
happening outside the purview of “federal statutes,” and that
much of it involves “distinct areas of law” other than traditional
environmental regulation. My focus will be on the issue of climate
change, where California has been particularly active.
Not all of California’s efforts have been met with approval,
even from observers who are highly sympathetic to the goals.
Some influential environmental scholars have debated whether
California might have done better to simply set a price on carbon
and avoid further regulatory apparatus, either by traditional
Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. This essay
was written for the Pace Environmental Law Review’s March 2015 Symposium,
Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law, held on March 20, 2015.
1. Symposium on Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law, PACE
LAW,
http://www.law.pace.edu/symposium-reconceptualizing-future-environ
mental-law (last visited Mar. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3F24-6NKS.
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regulators or elsewhere. I will use this debate to discuss some of
the costs and benefits of mainstreaming environmental law into
areas outside of the traditional environmental statutes.
Part I will address California’s broad portfolio of climate
measures. These measures certainly fit the organizer’s
description: none of them are federal, but many are implemented
by parts of the state government other than environmental
agencies, and some reach forms of conduct well outside
traditional environmental regulation. Part II will ask whether
the breadth of this regulatory portfolio is really desirable: would
we be better off to stick to a simple direct attack on carbon
emissions? Using so many different tools may simply be an
unnecessary complication, if not counterproductive. But a broad
portfolio might also be more effective in some ways.
I.

CALIFORNIA’S MULTIDIMENSIONAL
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW

In California, efforts focusing specifically on climate change
can be traced back to 1988, when a law required the first
inventory of in-state greenhouse gas emissions.2 Since then,
California has continued to pursue a wide range of policies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2006, Governor
Schwarzenegger signed into law the capstone of the State’s
climate policy, the California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006, or Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32).3
AB 32 sets a binding greenhouse gas emissions target,
requiring California to reduce emissions to the 1990 level by
2020, and to make deeper reductions by 2050.4 This law
generated world-wide attention, including a statement by the
British Prime Minister that its signing represented a “historic
day for the rest of the world as well.”5 The Prime Minister and

2. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1506.
3. 2006 Cal. Stat. 89 (codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99
(West 2010)) [hereinafter Assembly Bill 32].
4. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the
Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10653 (2007).
5. Id. at 10654 (citations omitted).
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the Governor of California also entered into an agreement to
share best practices on market-based systems and to cooperate to
investigate new technologies; similar agreements now exist
between California and states and provinces in Australia and
Canada.6 In the November 2010 elections, a ballot initiative to
suspend indefinitely the operation of AB 32 was soundly defeated,
with sixty-one percent of Californians voting to keep AB 32 in
effect.7 The vote showed that there is significant grassroots
support for climate change legislation, at least in California.
In implementing AB 32, the California State Air Resources
Board quickly developed nine “discrete early action greenhouse
gas emission reduction measures”8 designed to go into effect
before the trading system is implemented. Four of these actions
focus on reducing emissions of high global warming potential
(GWP) gases, which are gases whose impact on the climate is
hundreds or thousands of times greater than that of carbon
dioxide. The most significant of the early action items, however,
was establishing a low-carbon fuel standard, per Executive Order
S-01-07,9 to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of transportation
fuels by ten percent by 2020.10 The low carbon fuel standard
(LCFS) also allows suppliers to generate credits for exceeding the
reduction required for that year, creating the opportunity for a
trading market in credits among suppliers.11
Other early-action items provide some indication of how
California has gone beyond the traditional approach in which an
environmental agency imposes restrictions on a large industrial
source. Some of the most notable early-action items include
6. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 10659.
7. Margot Roosevelt, Prop. 23 Battle Marks New Era in Environmental
Politics, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/04/local/
la-me-global-warming-20101104, archived at http://perma.cc/7VAL-CTX6.
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560.5(a)-(b) (West 2010).
9. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 18, 2007),http://www.arb.ca.gov/
fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9GB2-R2T3.
10. INST. OF TRANSP. STUDIES, UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS, A LOW-CARBON FUEL
STANDARD FOR CALIFORNIA, PART 2: POLICY ANALYSIS 2 (2007), available at
pubs.its.ucdavis.edu/download_pdf.php?id=1084, archived at http://perma.cc/
6LBB-A5B3.
11. Id. at 53-54.
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increasing the capture of methane from landfills,12 creating a tire
pressure program that allows owners of vehicles to properly
maintain their tire pressure,13 and reducing diesel emissions
from ports by providing electricity to berthed ships.14
Even more notable than these early action items, of course, is
the later establishment of California’s cap-and-trade program,
which sets a declining, statewide cap on greenhouse gas
emissions15 and covers about six hundred industrial facilities.16
But, AB 32 is much more than the trading system supervised by
the California Air Resources Board. Indeed, a government list of
agencies implementing AB 32 includes the Business, Consumer
Services and Housing Agency, the California Department of
Public Health, the Office of Emergency Services, the California
Transportation Agency, the California Energy Commission, the
California Department of Food and Agriculture, and the
California Public Utilities Commission.17
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has been
particularly active. The CPUC has had an extensive energy
efficiency program since the 1970s.18 The CPUC also has a very
12. Landfill
Methane
Control
Measure,
CAL.
AIR
RES.
BD.,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/landfills/landfills.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/R53C-QJ69.
13. Tire Inflation Regulation, CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/tirepressure/tire-pressure.htm (last updated Dec. 16, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/9ZE7-D7MB.
14. Shore Power for Ocean-Going Vessels, CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/ports/shorepower/shorepower.htm (last updated Mar. 17,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FD7X-S6HX.
15. See generally ARB Emissions Trading Program Overview, CAL. AIR RES.
BD., available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2010/capandtrade.pdf (last
updated Oct. 27, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/7PTG-Q8NY.
16. Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011/cap_trade_overview.pdf (last
updated Oct. 20, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/44B9-ESHQ.
17. Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.
gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm
(last
updated
Aug.
5,
2014),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/D5MS-YVLZ.
18. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CA ENERGY EFFICIENCY STRATEGIC PLAN:
JANUARY 2011 UPDATE 1 (2011), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
NR/rdonlyres/A54B59C2-D571-440D-9477-3363726F573A/0/CAEnergyEfficiency
StrategicPlan_Jan2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P3NF-32QT (The CPUC
has adopted an ambitious strategic plan on energy efficiency based on a
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ambitious Renewables Portfolio Standard, under a series of three
State laws, resulting in about a twenty-three percent use of
renewables by the State’s largest private utilities.19 The 2020
target established by the legislature is thirty-three percent.20
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) also
mandates consideration of climate change.21 Like federal law,
CEQA mandates preparation of environmental assessments; but
unlike federal law, it also imposes a duty to mitigate
environmental impacts.22 Given that the statute applies not only
to state government, but also to local government, the result is to
embed environmental considerations into a wide range of
government actions, such as urban planning.
This is only a superficial look at California’s efforts, but it is
enough to make two points.
First, in terms of whether
environmental law has moved beyond federal statutes (or state
actions under the aegis of federal law), the answer is obviously
yes. California has been a very active player in climate change
and began well before any significant federal involvement.
Second, California has moved well beyond the classic regulations
of emitters that are the traditional staple of environmental law.
Rather, California has unleashed a barrage of different measures
involving many different aspects of life and many different kinds

recognition that “California’s very ambitious energy efficiency and greenhouse
gas reduction goals require long-term strategic planning to eliminate persistent
market barriers and effect lasting transformation in the market for energy
efficiency across the economy.”).
19. California Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), CAL. PUB. UTILS.
COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/NFK6-WD52.
20. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD QUARTERLY
REPORT, 3RD QUARTER 2014 (2014), available athttp://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
NR/rdonlyres/CA15A2A8-234D-4FB4-BE4105409E8F6316/0/2014Q3RPSReport
Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BV6R-CSW3.
21. See CEQA and Climate Change, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RES.,
http://opr.ca.gov/s_ceqaandclimatechange.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/6YC2-WHSW.
22. See, e.g., City of Marina v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 138 P.3d 692,
696 (Cal. 2006); Woodward Park Homeowners Ass’n v. City of Fresno, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 102, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
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of government agencies, covering everything from tire inflation by
automobile owners to land use planning and utility regulation.
Thus, the expansion of environmental law beyond the
traditional borders of federal environmental regulation is already
well underway in California. Still, one might ask, is that
expansion a good idea? Or does the future lie elsewhere?
II.

SHOULD WE CUT THE GORDIAN KNOT?

Perhaps the Californian approach is too complicated and
overworked. Ann Carlson explored the case for a simpler, more
direct approach in a 2012 article.23 Her basic thesis is simply
put:
If the government enacts a cap-and-trade scheme—but
independently regulates through complementary policies a
significant percentage of the emissions that would otherwise be
subject to cap-and-trade—the opportunities for reductions of
emissions covered by cap-and-trade will be reduced. Moreover the
emissions reductions occurring because of complementary
policies may be more expensive than reductions a cap-and-trade
scheme would produce independently—the point of cap-and-trade
is to find the cheapest cost reductions, and those may be different
reductions than the ones required by complementary policies. 24

It would be an oversimplification to say Carlson is merely
opposed to complementary measures. She suggests that
renewable portfolio standards are unlikely to be desirable unless
the cap-and-trade program is defective.25 But she sees more
promise in energy efficiency programs given the evidence that
consumers fail to make rational choices in that sphere.26
A stronger version of the Carlson thesis—stronger than
Carlson herself would endorse—would simply be that if we get

23. See Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade
and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207 (2012).
24. Id. at 210.
25. Id. at 231-40.
26. Id. at 240-48.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/7

6

FARBER-FINAL-NUMBERED

498

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

10/1/2015 10:42 AM

[Vol. 32

prices right, everything else will take care of itself. There is no
need to worry about dictating energy sources to utilities or
consumers, fostering public transportation, or making the urban
footprint less sprawling. Price signals will reverberate through
the economic system, making renewable energy and energy
efficiency more appealing, giving people an incentive to live in
more centrally located housing in order to cut commuting costs,
and making public transit a more attractive option compared
with cars.
Two other California environmental scholars, Holly Doremus
and Michael Hanemann, take a rather different view.27 Although
they view cap-and-trade as a useful tool, they argue that much
more must be done. In their opinion, appliance efficiency
measures, building codes, and land use planning decisions are
also needed, because price signals are too attenuated to change
individual behavior, and because at least some of the necessary
changes require collective decisions.28 For instance, they explain:
Home builders and buyers are responsible at some level for the
global-warming effects of home design and subdivision layout,
but buyers may have few choices; and builders are unlikely to be
large direct emitters, may be constrained by local zoning, and
may not be around long enough for the outcomes of their
decisions to become apparent.
Still other emissions are poor candidates for trading because the
accounting is difficult. For example, agricultural practices other
than fuel consumption are responsible for about 6% of U.S. GHG
emissions. . . . Since these activities occur in the open air and do
not involve fuel inputs which can be used as convenient proxies,
their emissions cannot be monitored with the precision required
for optimal trading markets.29

27. Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why
the Clean Air Act's Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing
Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (2008).
28. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 27, at 816.
29. Id.
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The difference between these two viewpoints should not be
exaggerated: both sides believe that cap-and-trade is an
important part of climate policy, but neither thinks it is entirely
sufficient. They also seem to agree that it is not enough to simply
impose numerical limits on carbon emissions by industry. But the
emphases are quite different.
The argument for relying on price signals is simple. Market
economies work by using price signals to coordinate behavior
across space, time, and multiple actors, rather than attempting to
use legal directives to make the market work. The more we see
climate change as a multidimensional problem, the more
appealing it becomes to use a simple price signal to deal with all
the dimensions at once.
The scholars discussed above would all agree on the
usefulness of these price signals, but their work points to several
limitations on their effectiveness. First, we might not get the
price right, either because it is deliberately set below the
optimum level for political reasons or because of defects in the
trading system. Second, some kinds of sources may be too difficult
to monitor for inclusion in the system. Third, there could be
collective action problems in the response of individuals or
communities to price changes. Fourth, human beings are fallible
and may not respond with perfect rationality to price signals. The
last three objections are not unrelated to the price level: a high
enough price may create enough motivation to find ways to
reduce emissions despite the obstacles. But the price may not be
high enough to have this effect.
The difficulty of being sure of the scope of these exceptions
argues for flexibility and local experimentation. Some of
California’s emphasis on complementary measures may well have
been due to doubts about how well an as-yet-untested trading
system would work. If the system works out well, the need for
some of the complementary measures may diminish. On the other
hand, experience may also show that even more vigorous
complementary measures are needed because trading systems
simply have too little impact on individual behavior—or for that
matter, on organizational behavior.
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To quickly sum up, this Symposium is about a vision of the
future of environmental law, one where environmental law has
overflowed the banks of the traditional EPA regulation. We saw
in Part I that this version of the future is already in full force in
California, as indicated by the multidimensional measures,
involving many different parts of government, undertaken to
address climate change. In Part II, we considered whether
market instruments might provide a much simpler approach to
addressing climate change and, by implication, other
environmental problems. It seems clear that market instruments
are not sufficient by themselves, but it is less clear just how much
supplementation is required. The efforts of California and other
jurisdictions should provide useful information about the right
balance between market instruments and complementary
measures. But we will not know the answer for some time.
The title to this short essay asks whether, in terms of the
issues involved in this symposium, California should be
considered a model for the future or an object lesson to be
avoided. The answer, no doubt, will turn out to be “both.” That is
the nature of all efforts to tackle intractable problems: they get
some things right the first time, but not others.
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